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The Cyrenaics are a fascinating but obscure ancient philosophical school, founded by Aristippus 
of Cyrene, one of Socrates' followers. The obscurity and relative neglect of the Cyrenaics is 
understandable, as we possess no primary texts by them and must rely on sometimes 
inconsistent reports by writers such as Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Sextus 
Empiricus to reconstruct their views. Nonetheless, these reports reveal a group of iconoclastic 
and singular thinkers well worth taking seriously, and there has been an uptick of interest in 
them (calling it a "boom" would be too generous) recently. 
In ethics, the Cyrenaics advance an unbridled hedonism, at least compared to Epicurus. They 
declare that bodily pleasures are greater than mental ones and criticize Epicurus by stating that 
freedom from mental turmoil and bodily pain isn't pleasurable, but the state of a corpse. And 
they dissent from the widespread eudaimonism in ancient Greek ethics, asserting that particular 
pleasure, rather than happiness, is our end. In epistemology, the Cyrenaics say that we have 
knowledge of our own affections (pathê), which are private to the percipient, but not of the 
external objects that cause them. Zilioli's ambitious study is the first book-length treatment in 
English of the Cyeranics' philosophy as a whole, covering the school's history, metaphysics, 
epistemology, views on personal identity, philosophy of language, and ethics. Unfortunately, 
though, Zilioli's arguments for his main claims do not succeed, and in my opinion the book 
does not advance our understanding of the Cyrenaics. 
Although the book ranges widely, its centerpiece -- on which many of its further positions 
depend -- is Zilioli's revisionary view of the Cyrenaics' metaphysics. The Cyrenaics are usually 
thought to have no metaphysical views regarding the world external to the percipient. Zilioli 
makes three claims about their views.  First, they think that the external world exists "as an 
indeterminate substratum, made up of no discrete and distinct objects" (p. 78). Second, Plato is 
referring to the epistemological and metaphysical views of Aristippus and other early Cyrenaics 
when he depicts the "subtle thinkers" allied with Protagoras and Heraclitus in Theaetetus156a3-
160c who advance a doctrine of radical flux (p. 50). Finally, this indeterminacy extends to the 
self, which is a loose bundle of perceptions extended across time, similar to the views of Hume 
and Parfit. Here is Zilioli's summary of the overall position: 
there are no proper objects as such in the world. For the Cyrenaics, there is a real 
substratum, mind-independent, and made up of an undifferentiated lump of matter. 
Such a substratum is not constituted by objects as single, unitary items, since what we 
conventionally term "objects" are no more than collections of secondary qualities. Since 
a metaphysics of indeterminacy cannot be a metaphysics of objects, we may reinterpret 
it as a metaphysics of processes, where the bundle of perceptions constituting the 
perceiving subject and the collection of secondary qualities constituting the perceived 
object are best seen as the result of temporary processes that casually [sic] put the 
former in touch with the latter (p. 117). 
So the Cyrenaics' restriction of knowledge to our affections isn't based on the weakness of our 
faculties and our inability to resolve conflicting sensory appearances and decide which are 
accurate. Instead, it's grounded on their view that the external world contains no determinate 
objects or essences to be grasped by us. 
Let's begin by sketching the received view that Zilioli rejects, and the texts on which it is based. 
(Unless otherwise noted, quotations of ancient sources are from Zilioli's appendix, where he 
helpfully includes thetestimonia he relies on.) The Cyrenaics' skeptical arguments start from 
noting cases in which an object appears F to one percipient and not-F to another, depending 
upon the percipients' condition, e.g., something that appears white to me may seem yellow to a 
fellow with jaundice and red to a chap with ophthalmia. From such cases, it's plausible to 
suppose that an object that isn't F can appear F to somebody (Sextus Against the Professors 7 
192-3, 197-8). 
My affections are obvious to me, e.g., that I am being whitened, and I cannot be mistaken about 
my present affections (Against the Professors 7 193-5, Plutarch Against Colotes 1120e-f). (The 
Cyrenaics were infamous for coining locutions like the jaundiced fellow being "moved yellowly," 
rather than simply saying that the wall appears yellow to him. This is similar to recent coinages 
like "I am appeared to redly." In both cases, such statements are designed to report only what is 
immediately given in one's experience.) But our affections are not sufficient evidence for 
judgments about the external objects that produce them (Against Colotes 1120d), and when we 
overstep our present affections and make such judgments we are liable to error (1120f). This is 
because an affection reveals nothing more than itself, and we have no criterion by which we 
could judge which of the conflicting claims regarding the objects is true (Against the 
Professors 7 194-5). 
This view still leaves open the scope of the Cyrenaics' skepticism. Our sources are inconsistent. 
Some report doubt about whether the external world exists at all, others doubt about the 
identity of objects in the external world, e.g., whether the object that heats me is fire, and 
others merely doubt about the properties of objects in the external world, e.g., whether the fire 
that heats me is really hot. (Warren (forthcoming) summarizes the issues and texts and argues 
for a restricted skepticism, as does Tsouna (1998) 75-88.) But wherever one comes down on 
this issue, the Cyrenaics are making an epistemological point grounded in the contrast between 
the privileged access we have to our affections and the inaccessibility, due to our cognitive 
limitations, of items in the external world. Plutarch describes the Cyrenaics as shutting 
themselves up inside their affections as in a state of siege (Against Colotes 1120d). Likewise, 
Sextus reports that we all make mistakes regarding the external object and cannot grasp the 
truth regarding it because "the soul is too weak to distinguish it on account of the places, the 
distances, the motions, the changes, and numerous other causes" (Against the Professors 7 
195, translation from Tsouna (1998) 155; Zilioli does not discuss this snippet.). 
The decisive objection against Zilioli's Indeterminacy Interpretation is that it is flatly 
incompatible with the many reports we have of the Cyrenaics' skepticism regarding the external 
world. According to Zilioli, the Cyrenaics advance an ambitious metaphysical thesis regarding 
the external world, that it is an indeterminate "lump of matter" in constant flux that contains no 
objects properly speaking. But the Cyrenaics are almost universally reported to eschew 
judgments regarding the external world. (In addition to the above passages, see Diogenes 
Laertius' report (not mentioned by Zilioli) that the Cyrenaics "abandoned the study of nature 
because of its manifest uncertainty" (DL II 92, trans. in Tsouna (1998) 158), Cicero Lucullus 76, 
and Aristocles apud Eusebius Praep. Evang. 14.19.1.) 
To his credit, Zilioli anticipates this objection, which he phrases as follows: "If they held the 
view that things are indeterminate, the Cyrenaics would actually say something about the 
nature of things and this would contradict their claim that only affections are knowable" (p. 84). 
He gives a two-fold response (pp. 84-86). First, the claim that things are indeterminate is a 
peculiar kind of claim. It is a denial that there are objects with any sort of essence or identity in 
the world that we could know about. Therefore, we shouldn't interpret the Cyrenaics as 
inconsistently advancing a positive thesis about the world's nature, when they are simply 
denying that it has any essence or determinate identity. And this denial explains their claims 
that we cannot apprehend external things, as there is nothing there to be apprehended. 
Secondly, even if we decide that the position is self-refuting, if we press matters enough, this 
should not automatically lead us on grounds of charity to reject the Indeterminacy 
Interpretation, any more than we should think Protagoras could not have been a relativist if we 
also hold that Socrates' self-refutation argument against the man-measure doctrine in 
the Theaetetus succeeds. 
To be fair to Zilioli, a metaphysical view of indeterminacy could underlie a certain type of 
skepticism, and such a view has been plausibly ascribed to Pyrrho, the namesake for the later 
skeptical movement. According to his disciple Timon, Pyrrho thinks that things are equally 
indifferent, unstable and indeterminate, and so we should have no opinions about them, saying 
about each thing that it no more is than is not. (Bett (2000) 14-62 argues in favor of this 
interpretation of Pyrrho, though it's controversial and is based on a passage that some think 
should be amended.) But the Indeterminacy Interpretation does not fit the evidence for the 
Cyrenaics' particular brand of skepticism. The Cyrenaics do not merely assert that we cannot 
grasp the essence of things -- which could be squared with the view that things have no such 
essence to be grasped. Instead, they say that we cannot know whether or not the object is really 
the way it appears to us. That leaves open the possibility that the fire is really hot, or the honey 
sweet -- and this possibility cannot be squared with the Indeterminacy Interpretation. 
Here is a representative passage: "[The Cyrenaics] said that, when burnt or cut, they knew that 
they were affected by something. But whether the thing which is burning them is fire, or that 
which cut them is iron, they could not tell" (Aristocles apud Eusebius Praep. Evang 14.19.1). 
Zilioli, surprisingly, takes this passage to support the Indeterminacy Interpretation: 
According to Aristocles' testimony, for the Cyrenaics we are incorrigibly aware of our 
affections because we are unable to know the real identity of the thing that appears to 
cause in us the affection we feel at present. We do not know whether the affection of hot 
we are now feeling is really caused by a fire or something else. This hints at the view 
that objects as such may indeed be non-existent. The Cyrenaics do away with objects as 
unitary and temporally stable items because they cannot even know what objects, if any, 
are in the world. (pp. 110-111) 
But far from hinting at the Indeterminacy Interpretation, Aristocles' testimony precludes it. 
Aristocles reports that, for the Cyrenaics, we cannot know whether or not it is a fire that heats 
me. This leaves open thepossibility that no such thing as fire exists. But that's far different from 
the Cyrenaics being committed to the thesis that no such objects as fires or chunks of iron 
exist. If they had such a commitment, they could know that the feeling of hot was not caused 
by a fire. 
Space limitations prevent me from considering all the testimonia Zilioli discusses, but I see 
none that definitively commit the Cyrenaics to indeterminacy, and many inconsistent with it, 
and so I think that the Indeterminacy Interpretation has little to recommend it. 
Zilioli's identification of the Protagorean-cum-Heraclitean 'subtle thinkers' of 
the Theaetetus with Aristippus and other early Cyrenaics is likewise dubious. Aristippus is never 
mentioned in the dialog. Zilioli's positive argument on behalf of the identification consists 
primarily of (a) claiming that Plato and Aristippus were probably well aware of each other's 
philosophical positions, and (b) noting the similarities between the Cyrenaics' and the subtle 
thinkers' characterization of our affections/perceptions and our infallible acquaintance with 
them. But even granting (a) and (b) -- which I do -- gives little basis for attributing the subtle 
thinkers' epistemology and metaphysics to the Cyrenaics. (Zilioli also states that Aristippus' 
doctrine that affections of pleasure are short-lived (monochronos) processes is a "textual hint" 
that the Cyrenaics endorsed an across-the-board metaphysics of processes (p. 113). But I don't 
see how thinking that pleasure is an evanescent psychic process hints at a global 
Heraclitean/Protagorean metaphysics.) 
Suppose that I state "the wind is hot" and you state "the wind is cold." The Protagorean will say 
that both statements are true (for the person who makes the statement), and, as Socrates 
observes, he abolishes the possibility of error. Such apparently contradictory statements can 
both be true because it turns out that they're really about how things appear to each percipient, 
and the Heraclitean doctrine of radical flux, which denies that there are any stable objects out 
there for our statements to be about, supports this anti-realist semantics. 
The Cyrenaic won't say that both statements are true; instead, at least one is false. As Sextus 
states inAgainst the Professors 7 195, "we all are infallible as far our own affection is 
concerned, but we all are in error about what is out there." We have incorrigible knowledge of 
our affections, and we ought to characterize them in a way that strips away any reference to 
things external to the perceiver. But if the statement "the wind is hot" is true, it's true because 
there exists a mind-independent object, the wind, having the mind-independent property of 
heat. So the Cyrenaics accept a realist semantics for such statements, and they have no reason 
to advance a doctrine of radical flux. (See O'Keefe (2011) for more on these issues.) 
Zilioli, however, elides the differences between these positions when discussing the Cyrenaics 
on knowledge: 
In Cyrenaic epistemology there is no explicit reference to relativity. Yet, the Cyrenaics 
are not so distant from Protagoras; for them, each affection is the source of individual 
knowledge . . . the best way to account philosophically for the view that all affections 
are true (Cyrenaic subjectivism) is to interpret that view as ultimately reducible to 
relativism . . . While retaining the same dichotomy between appearances and the world, 
Pyrrho reversed the epistemological optimism of the Cyrenaics and of Protagoras when 
he suggested that appearances could not tell us anything true. (p. 122) 
But I see no reason to "reduce" the Cyrenaics' position to Protagoras', and to ascribe to the 
Cyrenaics an "epistemological optimism" does not square with the reports on them. 
I have mainly been discussing chapters 3 ("The Theaetetus"), 4 ("Indeterminacy"), and 5 
("Persons, objects, and knowledge"). In chapter 7 ("Pleasure and happiness"), Zilioli turns to 
Cyrenaic ethics, arguing that the Cyrenaics can allow for happiness to have an important place 
in their ethics despite their rejection of a unified self extended across time. (See Irwin (1991), 
who argues that the Cyrenaics reject an extended self and hence reject eudaimonia as the end, 
and Tsouna (2002) and O'Keefe (2002) for criticisms of Irwin.) He also claims that the hedonism 
elaborated and then attacked in Plato's Philebus is Aristippus'. The book closes with a brief look 
at the later Cyrenaic sects founded by Hegesias, Anniceris, and Theodorus (Chapter 8, "Cyrenaic 
philosophy and its later epigoni"). 
Besides advancing an overall reconstruction of the Cyrenaics' philosophy, Zilioli has a secondary 
aim: to establish the philosophical bona fides of Aristippus (aka Aristippus the Elder). We have 
little information about him: mostly unreliable gossip in Diogenes Laertius about his devotion 
to pleasure, his willingness to disregard convention in pursuing it, and his various quips. Based 
on a report in Eusebius, it's often thought that Cyrenaic philosophy proper was articulated by 
Aristippus' grandson, confusingly named Aristippus (aka Aristippus the Younger). Chapter 3 on 
the Theaetetus is supposed to serve double-duty, both confirming Aristippus' philosophical 
importance and improving our understanding of the Cyrenaic position. Chapter 1 ("Schools and 
scholarship") has an extended discussion of what a philosophical "school" is in antiquity and an 
overview of recent scholarship. In chapter 2 ("Aristippus"), Zilioli tries to find anticipations of 
many Cyrenaic ethical and epistemological doctrines in the testimonia we have regarding 
Aristippus the Elder, and argues that Aristippus is properly regarded as the founder of the 
Cyrenaic school. 
In chapter 6 ("Language and meaning"), Zilioli takes up a fascinating report by Sextus Empiricus 
(Against the Mathematicians 7 195-197). 
No criterion is common to human beings, common names are assigned to objects. All in 
common in fact call something white or sweet, but they do not have something common 
that is white or sweet. Each human being is aware of his own private affection. One 
cannot say, however, whether this affection occurs in oneself and in one's neighbor from 
a white object, since one cannot grasp the affection of the neighbor . . . And since no 
affection is common to us all, it is hasty to declare that what appears to me a certain 
way appears the same to my neighbor as well. [Sextus goes on to give the cases of 
jaundice and ophthalmia discussed above.] 
Tsouna takes this passage to anticipate modern discussions of the problem of other minds, but 
to differ from them in important respects, e.g., by not relying on the distinction between mental 
and physical (Tsouna (1998) 89-104). Zilioli, however, thinks that in order to account for the 
possibility of terms like "white" having a common meaning in the absence of either a common 
affection or even a common object to refer to, the Cyrenaics must adopt a "behavioural theory 
of meaning" (p. 141) through which we come to understand the meaning of a term like "white" 
by "means of shared linguistic rules and behaviours" (p. 147). He compares this to 
Wittgenstein's conception of meaning in the Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein 
rejects the possibility of a private language. I find drawing the Cyrenaics close to the later 
Wittgenstein quite dubious -- after all, Wittgenstein's point is to dissolve the skeptical worries 
raised by the supposed privacy of one's sensations, whereas the context of the Cyrenaic 
passage is to exacerbate those worries. If the meaning of the term "white" were given in a 
Wittgensteinian fashion by the rules of our language game, then whether or not the object that 
appears white to me and that others report is white is really white wouldn't be an issue. 
If Zilioli's book spurs further interest in the Cyrenaics, that would be welcome. And trying to 
shed light on the Cyrenaics by comparing them to ancient philosophers such as Protagoras and 
Heraclitus as well as modern and contemporary philosophers such as Hume, Wittgenstein and 
Parfit can be fruitful. But from what I can tell, Zilioli's particular proposals are by and large 
unsustainable. 
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